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Abstract Attribute-based credentials are cryptographically secured carriers of properties that hold 
for a particular individual. They are the basic building blocks of many upcoming privacy-enhancing 
technologies and user-centric identity management systems. There are a number of limitations and 
requirements besides security and privacy, such as usability and efficiency, that have to be taken 
into account when designing specific credentials in practice. 
This paper elaborates several realistic on-line and off-line use cases in attribute-based identity 
management; moreover, it identifies and analyses some of the design issues that require a decision 
or solution. It provides the most important credential design principles and also shows how setting 
up an attribute-based credential system formalises identity relationships in society. 
Keywords attribute-based credential, smart card, pilot, identity management, identity card 
Introduction 
Authorisation requires authentication: before letting someone do or use something, it must be 
clear that this someone is actually allowed to do so. Traditionally, authentication is understood as 
proof of identity, for instance, by means of a password or an identity document. But precisely 
identifying people, using uniquely identifying numbers and names—such as a social security number 
(SSN), credit card or bank account number—is often an overkill. In many situations it suffices to know 
some attribute (property) of a person in order to authorise a transaction. If a hairdresser offers a cheap 
haircut to students, it is not necessary, or even desirable, that the hairdresser learns a (uniquely 
identifying) student number as part of the proof of ‘studentship’. Similarly, buying an alcoholic drink 
only requires a proof that the buyer is above a certain age limit (16, 18, or 21). Attribute-based 
authentication aims to provide a mechanism for precisely doing this: allowing transactions on the basis 
of those attributes which are required for the transaction. The main advantages are: 
• it is privacy-friendly, in the sense that it is based on the idea of data minimisation and 
that it provides unlinkability among user transactions; 
• it offers protection against identity fraud: if one's identity is not involved in a transaction, 
it cannot be stolen; 
• it provides a new, more flexible approach in identity management and authentication, in 
particular, an approach that is based on attributes instead of unique identities. 
Attribute-based authentication is not new. Attribute certificates [10] were defined in the X.509 
stack over a decade ago. They enable authentication that does not require identification; e.g., role-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
 Supported by the research program Sentinels as project ‘Mobile IDM’ (10522). 
based access or proof of membership. However, they are (1) linkable (each transaction is linked to the 
same public key) and (2) transferable (delegateable). Attributes in the context of attribute-based 
credentials and in this paper are different; they provide security, unlinkability, and untransferability 
simultaneously (see details about security and privacy properties in Section 2). Cryptographic 
techniques that enable secure and privacy-friendly attribute-based authentication have also been 
around for more than a decade, see [4, 7, 8, 14]. But what is new is that the latest generation of smart 
cards is powerful enough to perform the required (non-trivial) cryptographic operations in an 
adequately efficient manner. Hence only now we see efforts to actually deploy attributes in practice. 
This paper is based on the experiences in one such deployment in the course of a pilot project, 
namely the IRMA project
2
 in The Netherlands. It relies on the Idemix technology [13] and uses 
personal smart cards as carriers of credentials and attributes—see the next section for more details. 
Getting attribute technology up-and-running brings us into largely unexplored territory that poses a 
multitude of technical and organisational challenges. But also it leads to new (research) questions and 
forces us to think deeper and more systematically about the technology and its implications. As its 
main contribution, the current paper explores these matters. It concentrates on the issues that arise 
regarding the organisation of multiple attributes and of the dependencies between them, and on the 
decisions that need to be made to make these cryptographic techniques and their implementation 
practical while preserving their advanced properties. Many other interesting topics are out of scope, 
like the underlying cryptography [7, 8], the smart card technicalities, or a detailed security analysis. 
To the best of our knowledge, there are two other pilot projects in the context of attribute-based 
credentials. Both of them are carried out by the EU-sponsored ABC4Trust [6]. The Swedish pilot [3] 
gives anonymous access for elementary school pupils to on-line resources (e.g., chat room), while the 
Greek pilot [1] enables university students to evaluate lectures anonymously. In both cases eligibility 
and privacy are of primary importance. Although our pilot uses the same underlying technology, the 
objective of our research is more general as we investigate a broad variety of attributes and 
applications. The kind of challenges investigated in this paper do not appear in these ABC4Trust pilots 
since each focusses on a single context. 
One may view an individual’s identity as the collection of all attributes that hold for him/her. We 
can imagine that using a personal smart card, people manage dozens of attributes for various 
authentication goals, determined by the organisations that they interact with. Given that there are 
many dependencies between all these attributes, the question of how to organise them in a 
logical/coherent and intuitive manner is non-trivial and not free from politics (information is power). 
This is the main topic of this paper. We make the various issues explicit that we came across in the 
context of our pilot project and explain the choices we have made. This is certainly relevant beyond 
this particular project. 
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2  Technical Background 
Technically, digital credentials, containing attributes, form a coherent unit. In our discussion, 
however, attributes play a more important role conceptually. We can simplify it and say that credentials 
are issued and attributes are shown. In this section we describe some abstract technical details of the 
technology, the participants, and our implementation. 
Attributes  In the current context an attribute is some property of or a piece of data about a person 
that some party (most often some authority) attested to. We briefly elaborate. 
Some attributes are identifying and some are non-identifying, i.e., some attributes hold for a 
single individual (in a particular context) whereas other attributes hold for many people. For instance, 
the attribute ‘male’ is in general not identifying, but the attribute ‘bank account is …’ identifies the 
(sole) holder of the account. The phrase ‘anonymous credential system’ is often used in the literature 
for systems like U-Prove and Idemix, but in the current context attributes need not be anonymous 
(non-identifying).  
What is important is that for a particular individual an attribute either holds or not, at a particular 
point in time. So, for instance, the attribute ‘under 18’ may hold now for my son, but may no longer 
hold next year: the validity of personal attributes is time-dependent. 
In this context it is assumed that there is some authority that can decide whether attribute A 
holds for person P at time t, and that this authority is willing to provide this attribute to P with its digital 
signature. For instance, my bank can digitally sign the statement what my bank account is at this 
moment, and provide the result in a credential to me. In some cases it is obvious for a given attribute 
which authority is in the best position to issue it in a credential: my bank is most authoritative when it 
comes to my bank account. But in other cases there may be multiple authorities. An example might be 
my address attribute, which can be provided either by the municipal authorities or, for example, by the 
postal service. We return to this matter later on. 
Part of such a digital signature on an attribute is usually an expiration date. The expiration date 
may be necessary because the attribute may no longer hold after some time (like for ‘under 18’). But 
expiration may also be used to limit the usage period of an attribute. For instance, the signature on the 
attribute containing my home address may expire after a year in order to ensure that it is reasonably 
fresh (and thus accurate). 
Credentials  A credential, in the context of this paper, is a cryptographic container for attributes. It is 
digitally signed by a trusted party, the issuer (see more details below). This digital signature provides 
certainty about the validity of the attributes within the credential and also about the fact that they have 
not been changed since issuance. Furthermore, credentials hide the attributes; so, seeing a credential, 
one cannot deduce any information about the attribute values in it. The structure of a credential 
(i.e. the semantics and types of attributes in it), unlike its content, is public. This enables a card holder 
and a verifier to select the appropriate credential(s) for a certain scenario (see example scenarios in 
Section 3). 
Anonymous credentials were already proposed over 25 years ago by David Chaum [9]. They 
enable individuals to authenticate without identification and to perform unlinkable actions. Stefan 
Brands [4] suggested practical and efficient cryptographic protocols for implementing digital 
credentials that include multiple attributes. Recently this notion was renamed to attribute-based 
credentials (ABCs). An ABC may contain several attributes that can be shown independently of one 
another. Brands’ protocols belong now to Microsoft’s U-Prove technology [5, 12] and replace 
Microsoft’s earlier Windows CardSpace approach. Jan Camenisch and Anna Lysyanskaya [7, 8] 
proposed another technology for attribute-based credentials, using zero-knowledge proofs. These 
schemes are now collected in IBM’s Idemix [13]. ABC4Trust [6] aims to create a common architecture 
for these technologies.  
Our pilot project uses an efficient smart card implementation of Idemix; but conceptually it could 
also use the U-Prove technology. A smart card may contain dozens of credentials, each with multiple 
attributes. In a particular attribute-based authentication proof, any subset of attributes in a single 
credential may be revealed, without revealing the remaining attributes. This is called selective 
disclosure. Also, several attributes from different credentials may be revealed, like ‘over 21’ and 
‘Student’. 
Within the context of this project at most four attributes are grouped together in a credential, see 
Figure 1. The number four is chosen pragmatically, mainly for implementation reasons, but other 
reasons turn out to confirm this choice. On the one hand, having many attributes in one credential 
means that if only one attribute is revealed, all the others remain hidden. Hiding more attributes 
requires more time, and thus reduces the performance. On the other hand, the number four seems to 
be reasonable to form a coherent set of attributes, issued jointly by a single authority. 
All credentials are required to contain two additional basic attributes. First, an expiry date has to 
be determined at issuance, and it is included as an attribute applying to the whole credential. When 
the credential is verified, the expiry date can be revealed to confirm validity. Second, each user has a 
master secret key, stored in the smart card’s secure storage, which is also incorporated—technically, 
like an attribute—in all credentials. 
  
  
Figure 1: The structure of an attribute-based credential with two reserved and four ‘free’ attributes. 
Roles  In attribute-based identity management we distinguish the following roles.  
1. Users are people who own a smart card that holds valid attributes; validity means that the 
attributes on the card are valid for the card holder (and are not expired). 
2. Issuers are the authorities that sign credentials with attributes and provide them to Users. For 
instance, citizen registration authorities are the obvious issuers of ‘over 18’ attributes (and of 
many other attributes as well) and banks are authoritative issuers of bank account number 
attributes.  
3. Verifiers (also called relying parties) are the parties that verify a subset of the available 
attributes on a card in order to authorise a transaction. An example verifier is a website that 
wants to verify the attribute ‘over 18’ before it allows me to view a certain video online. 
4. The scheme manager is an independent, non-profit organisation that sets the rules for the 
different parties (users, issuers and verifiers) and is responsible for the software and smart card 
management. Of course, these roles can be split up and assigned to different organisations, but 
that is not so relevant for the current discussion.  
Security and privacy properties  Attribute-based credentials are assumed to provide the following 
security properties. (1) The issuer’s digital signature ensures authenticity: the credential originates 
from the issuer, and this issuer assures that the attributes hold for the person. (2) This signature also 
guarantees integrity: the attributes contained in the credential have not been changed since they have 
been issued. (3) A credential is non-transferable as it is bound to the card of the person involved in the 
issuing protocol.  
Furthermore, an attribute-based credential protects the privacy of its owner by the following 
cryptographic properties. (a) A credential hides its content, so it does not reveal the attributes that it 
contains. (b) Issuer unlinkability assures that any information gathered during issuing cannot be used 
to link the credential when it is shown. (c) Multi-show unlinkability guarantees that when a credential is 
shown multiple times, these sessions cannot be linked. The privacy of users is protected by both of 
these unlinkability properties even if the credential issuer and all verifiers collude. 
Implementation used in this pilot  In this paper we rely on technical assumptions from the pilot 
project that we are working on. We make these assumptions explicit.  
1. The smart cards are MULTOS cards, because they provide relatively easy access to 
cryptographic primitives. The cards communicate via a wireless interface. Preferably, card 
readers are used that have a (secure) PIN pad. In the (near) future, widely employed card 
readers will probably be smart phones and tablets with their NFC interface. 
2. Attributes are stored on smart cards in credentials; each credential can store up to four 
attributes, which are collectively issued (and signed) by one issuer. Hence, one design criterium 
for the contents of credentials is that all the attributes involved should fall under the 
responsibility of a single issuer. 
3. Selective disclosure is an essential functionality. The verification of one or more attributes from 
the same credential can be done rather efficiently, taking on average in the order of one 
second
3
. Verification of multiple attributes from multiple credentials is also possible (within one 
session), but then the verification times add up, proportional to the number of credentials. 
4. Issuing takes place per credential (and not per attribute) and is rather slow: in the order of 3 to 4 
seconds. Typically, issuing is done either during a physical session (e.g., at the town hall) or 
online at a device that the user trusts (e.g., a personal tablet or a home PC). 
As a result, attributes are appropriate for rather static scenarios, and not for dynamic scenarios, 
such as an electronic purse, where the monetary value on the card is stored as an attribute: 
spending money would involve both verification (of the old amount, before paying) and re-
issuing (the new amount, after paying). This is simply too slow with the current smart card 
technology. 
5. Users have a ‘card management’ environment at their PC or other device, in which they have 
read/delete/update access to all the data on the card. Within this environment they can see 
dependencies (in tree-form, like in Figure 2) and inspect access logs. Furthermore, users can 
delete credentials or initiate to update them. 
6. The whole process in relation to attributes and credentials takes place using open standards 
(and to a large extent even via open source software). This means that, in principle, every 
organisation or individual can use the same card for their own purpose, by issuing and verifying 
their own attributes. However, the scheme manager controls access to the cards (see also in 
Section 5). This happens by special certificates that terminals need to have before cards are 
willing to communicate with them. The role of the scheme manager enforces a certain level of 
consistency among issuers and verifiers and (thereby) protects the card holders.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 This one second is good enough for verifications online or offline, say in a shop, but too slow for entrance control 
like in public transport; in such cases the required maximal transaction time is typically 0.3 second. 
3  Use Cases 
This section gives an informal description of some of the use cases that we foresee for attribute-
based authentication. As the current discussion considers attributes of a wide variety, we let attributes 
be non-identifying as well as identifying. We do not address however the problem of attribute 
semantics or anonymity sets in different scopes. While ABCs were originally devised for anonymous 
applications, we are convinced that they provide many more usage and application opportunities with 
(partly) identifying attributes. The use cases described shortly below form the basis for some further 
discussion of issues analysed in Section 5. 
Age bounds  The attribute that is most needed now is probably the minimal-age attribute, like ‘over 
18’. It will be useful for many online and offline transactions, such as buying/playing (violent) games, 
for alcoholic drinks, cigarets, (certain) movies or books, online gambling, etc. Analogously, one may 
form maximal-age attributes, like ‘under 15’. They may be used to regulate access to certain chat 
rooms which are set up exclusively for minors. 
Within the Idemix context there are ‘interval proofs’ which make it possible to derive these 
minimal- and maximal-age attributes from the date of birth. Such proofs are computationally rather 
expensive and are (currently) not included in this project. Instead, minimal-age and maximal-age 
credentials are foreseen consisting of the form:  
  
The most authoritative issuers for such credentials are local or national authorities, using their 
citizen registration database. 
Citizen Identity  Your identity as citizen may be organised in three credentials:  
  
As before, public authorities are the most authoritative source to issue such credentials. Recall 
that each of these attributes can be used separately in authentication. But also combinations of these 
(and other) attributes are possible. 
Loyalty Cards and Pseudonyms  Shops, or other commercial organisations such as airlines, like to 
build a relationship with their customers using loyalty cards, giving them selected benefits when they 
have accumulated enough loyalty points. Applying such cards, these 
shops can keep track of who purchases what and this allows them to 
build up detailed profiles of their customers. In practice, each chain 
of shops issues its own (virtual) loyalty card. This is no longer 
needed with an open card, since each chain can add its own loyalty 
credential to it. 
The customer number in the credential acts as a key for a 
database entry in the back office that contains the actual purchase history of the customer (card 
holder). On the basis of this history, a customer may reach a certain status, like bronze/silver/gold. In 
each shopping situation the customer may be offered the option to buy anonymously, using only the 
status attribute to get certain benefits, or to buy non-anonymously using also the customer number. 
Only in the latter case, the purchase is added to the personal history (in the back office) and 
contributes to the status build-up. The remaining two attributes, written as ‘…’, are left open and can 
be used for other customer relationship management (CRM) purposes. They can also be left empty 
(blank). 
A card holder may use his/her card with this credential offline, in a ‘brick and mortar’ shop. But it 
can also be used online, to purchase something, or to access an overview of the card holder’s 
purchase history and, possibly, to update the status attributes. For these purposes, the loyalty number 
attribute is sufficient as authentication. Of course name & gender are nice to have for communication 
purposes, but they need not be the real ones. An address credential may be required in case of 
delivery. It can be verified per transaction, and need not be stored centrally. 
Such customer numbers in credentials may thus be used as pseudonyms, one for each 
commercial relationship (with shops X, Y, Z, etc.). There is a potential privacy risk when many 
commercial organisations decide to cooperate and use one number for all of them. In this way they 
can profile customers across different organisations, a bit like it is done now via third party cookies or 
device fingerprinting. Such broad commercial use of a single pseudonym, possibly at a national level, 
may be forbidden by the scheme manager and/or by the relevant data protection authority. 
Medical information  In a medical context one can envisage attributes for patients and for medical 
staff. Patients can carry for instance credentials with attributes containing essential personal medical 
information in a micro-dossier, see the first two credentials below. Medical staff can use credentials 
that describe their medical role and access rights to patient files, as suggested in:  
  
The first two credentials may be issued by health authorities (hospitals, or even general 
practitioners). They are useful in medical emergency situations, like after an accident. The last 
credential falls under the responsibility of health staff registration authorities. The ‘position’ attribute 
typically determines access right to medical records, such as: doctors may both read and write, but 
nurses may only read. For accountability, the registration number should be used in each such 
transaction in order to monitor who accesses which file. 
At this stage, it becomes clear that designing the content of credentials is not entirely trivial, and 
requires knowledge of the relevant domain of use. Another thing to note is that the names of the card 
holder are not included in these credentials. For now it suffices to say that the name occurs in a Name 
credential, so there is no need to repeat it. But this ‘overlap’ matter will be discussed further below. 
Access control and role/claim-based access control  Within one company/organisation X, a 
credential can be designed for specific access rights, roles, positions, etc., as suggested in:  
  
Issuing a mobile phone number credential  So far we have concentrated mostly on the contents of 
credentials. We now look at how the issuing of credentials might work. Suppose you wish to obtain a 
credential containing your mobile phone number. The obvious issuer is your mobile network operator 
(MNO). The issuing procedure might work via the following steps.  
1. You go to the website of the MNO, using https, and prove using your IRMA card your name and 
date of birth. 
2. The MNO looks in its database if there is a contract with this name and date of birth
4
; if not, it 
aborts; if so, it sends a one-time code over SMS to the (mobile) phone number associated with 
this contract. 
3. Upon receiving this one-time code, you feed it back into the website (within the same https 
session). 
4. The MNO now issues the credential containing your phone number, possibly together with 
some other attributes, to your card.  
What is interesting about this protocol is that it involves authentication that uses both existing 
credentials and an out-of-band channel. The use of existing credentials leads to dependencies among 
credentials, as described in Section 4. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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 In many countries, before obtaining a mobile phone subscription, a copy of an identity document must be 
handed over; this is assumed here. 
Festival ticket  We conclude this list of use cases with a non-standard application of attributes, in 
order to suggest the great variety and breadth of possible usage scenarios. If you wish to get a ticket 
online for a pop concert or other festivals, you often need to fill out long forms requiring personal 
information. The main purpose—apart from profiling—seems to be to prevent transfer of tickets. One 
may also provide such a ticket in electronic form, after payment, as a credential for the festival at 
hand, containing for instance: the festival name & date, a ticket number, any additional pre-paid 
consumptions, etc. Upon entering the festival terrain, the presence of a valid ticket on a card can be 
checked (and consumption vouchers can be handed over). The next day the ticket/credential is 
unusable, and can be removed from the card (by the card owner). 
4  An Example Credential Tree 
As we saw in Figure 1, credentials are containers of attributes signed by an authoritative issuer. 
An issuing procedure requires some sort of authentication to prove that a specific card is entitled to 
hold a credential. This authentication can include the verification of already existing credentials on the 
card. On the one hand, so-called root credentials do not rely on other credentials on the card. They 
require only out-of-band authentication. Dependent credentials, on the other hand, are issued only 
after verifying at least one other existing credential on the card. Technically, it is essential that the 
verification and the issuance happen in the same secure session. 
Figure 2 shows a dependency graph, a possible arrangement of digital credentials logically 
residing on a card in the IRMA project. In this example, there are two root credentials. An Academia 
credential represents the card holder’s identity in the national education system. A Citizen root 
credential can be used by a broader audience in a broader context. These root credentials can be 
issued after a personal, face-to-face identification accompanied by a physical identity document 
authentication. 
A Student credential, for instance, relies only on the Academia root. After a student proves that 
he or she has such a root credential with the appropriate attributes of Organisation and unique student 
identifier (SID), the organisation can look up all relevant personal data in its database and issue the 
Student credential. Note that this issuing procedure requires identification since a Student credential is 
bound to a specific person. A university’s Library credential can be issued similarly relying on an 
already existing Student credential. It can depend on policies, defined by the Scheme manager, which 
attributes a particular issuer is eligible to verify in relation to issuing a particular type of credential. 
Issuance therefore often requires verification of credentials from the card, not only an out-of-
band authentication. The simplest case is when only one credential is verified. But authentication can 
include multiple credentials residing in different parts of the dependency graph. Business scenarios, 
involving legal obligations, often require credentials from the citizen ‘tree’—not only from the one that 
provides discount for the customer. A festival, for instance, may offer cheaper tickets for students 
(academia) while requiring certain minimum age (citizen) to give a voucher for alcoholic drinks.  
We foresee that the scheme manager decides in a contract with each Issuer what the 
dependencies and (out-of-bound) authentication methods are (required for issuing). These matters will 
then be made public, so that others (esp. Verifiers) know what they can/cannot rely on. 
  
  
Figure 2: An example for credentials and dependencies. 
5  Problems and Decisions 
This section discusses several issues that we came across in setting up the IRMA pilot project. 
Although we recognise the importance of cost and liability in deploying a new technology, these 
considerations are out of scope in this study. In the decisions we took the main motivations were: 
simplicity of the set-up, intuitiveness of usage, protection of privacy, and security. 
Outside of a card  In online usage the outside of a card is irrelevant for the issuer or the verifier. The 
only practical requirement is that the card owner should recognise his/her own card (to prevent 
confusion). In offline scenarios, however, the verifier should be able to check that the person 
presenting a card is the card holder. This is done via two mechanisms:  
• on the front of the card there is a picture of the cardholder—and nothing else;  
• the verification of many attributes is only possible after a PIN is entered; as a result, if 
someone else wishes to use your card, you should also give your PIN. This works as 
hindrance.  
At the back of a card there is (general) information about how lost cards can be returned. 
Additionally, there is a card-specific number. It can be used to look up the owner of a lost-and-returned 
card. The card number is a dangerous addition that could make it possible to trace cards. Therefore, 
the card number is used only externally, and not internally, in the chip. 
Restricting relying parties  One serious challenge is how to make sure that a verifier (relying party) 
does what it promises: if a web shop says it only needs to see my ‘over 18’ attribute, how do I know 
that it does not read all other attributes as well? There are several possible approaches.  
1. A purely legal one: let verifiers sign a contract with the scheme manager in which they commit 
themselves to behave as they promise. 
2. Add a posteriori monitoring: make sure that the card logs all transactions, and take (legal) 
action if a verifier reads too much. 
3. Add a priori technical restrictions: verifiers obtain a certificate from the scheme manager that 
will be checked by the card and that contains the attributes that the verifier may read; the card 
is programmed in such a way that it only reveals the attributes that are listed in the certificate.  
The first two options provide no protection against rogue verifiers, operating outside the span of 
control of the scheme manager. The last solution is therefore the most secure one, but also the most 
inflexible and complicated one, since it requires an elaborate certificate management policy. It is the 
preferred solution within the IRMA project (although it is not yet implemented). 
With this third solution in place, protecting card reading by a PIN is less urgent—increasing user 
convenience. For instance, it is not wise to protect medical emergency data by a PIN, since the card 
holder may not be able to provide it when needed most. But by providing only to medical emergency 
services a certificate to read the medical data, the privacy risks are reduced. 
An alternative solution is to use designated proofs [2] in which the prover can control which 
verifier can receive particular attributes. Selective disclosure (see in Section 2) enables to restrict 
which attributes are revealed, while designation enables to restrict which verifiers can receive those 
attributes. When this technique is applied, verifiers are required to have secret keys for being able to 
compute those attributes. As this technology entails an additional infrastructure for designation keys 
(or certificates) and is still in its infancy, we do not use it at this stage of the IRMA project. 
PIN use and card management  In general, access to a card can be protected by a PIN. This is used 
to ensure:  
• confidentiality: to prevent unauthorised reading of private data, for instance, after a 
card loss; the use of certificates (as discussed above) restricts this risk to some extent, 
but does not remove it; 
• user consent: to make sure that a card is only used when the card holder agrees; 
• authentication: the card is only usable by the card owner; in particular, someone else 
who obtains/finds a card cannot use it.  
It is clear that the addition of new credentials to a card should be protected by a PIN, to 
guarantee consent & authentication. But when should revealing of attributes be protected by a PIN? 
You may think of the fairly innocuous ‘over 18’ attribute. But it should not be possibly that my little 
nephew temporarily borrows my card to do/obtain ‘over 18’ stuff online. Hence the the age credential 
should be PIN-protected. Attributes that give access to a parking or open an entrance are typically not 
PIN-protected, except for high-security facilities. 
If some credentials require PIN-protection and others do not, the question arises: who decides 
about this? Of course it can be left to the card reader or the user to set PIN-protection, but probably 
following some general policy is better. This policy should be set in general terms by the scheme 
manager, and elaborated in detail with each credential issuer. 
Card hand-over  A User obtains a card during a face-to-face protocol, called card hand-over. It 
involves verification of the (external) photo, PIN setting by the new card owner, and issuance of a 
number of root credentials. In the database of the scheme manager an entry will be maintained 
involving the external card number, contact details of the card owner, and a timestamp recording the 
hand-over. 
Expiry and revocation  In the current stage of the pilot project revocation will not be implemented 
although in a large-scale project this functionality is essential. Recent developments [11] show that 
privacy-friendly revocation techniques are reaching performance figures that make addition of 
revocation possible at some later stage in the project. Expiry data in credentials, see Figure 1, put 
some limit on the usability of credentials after a card loss. Additionally, some identifying attributes, 
containing for instance a registration number, can be blacklisted on the basis of their content. 
Attribute duplication in the tree?  In the credential examples in Section 3 we have seen that a card 
holder’s name occurs in the Name credential (obviously!), but not in a medical staff or employee 
credential. This may look unexpected at first. In principle, there could be multiple name attributes, 
issued by different parties (like local authorities, or Facebook; see below). Similarly, multiple accounts 
at different banks or different phone numbers can be issued in separate credentials. It is the role of the 
scheme manager to decide which organisations are authoritative about a type of credential. Verifiers 
can then decide which issuer they wish to trust for having attested to certain attributes. However, we 
propose as few attributes to be issued by multiple issuers as possible for simplicity and efficiency. In 
fact, so far we are excluding any duplication of attributes (same content, different issuers). 
Facebook – root credential or not?  In what follows, we take Facebook as example in 
considerations that apply to many other, similar organisations. If you sign up for Facebook, you 
choose the name that you like (within certain technical/decency limits). Facebook has a Real Name 
Policy, but it has no way of checking that the name you provide is your real one. Many people like to 
use a pseudonym on Facebook and currently this is possible. 
Now suppose Facebook wishes to join the project at hand and use smart card based credentials 
for authentication. The credential only needs to contain Facebook’s user ID. An interesting question is: 
should this be a root credential or not? This technical question has wide societal relevance.  
1. Facebook probably does not want to have a root credential: it likes to first verify the (real) name 
on the card (and probably more attributes), before issuing its own credential. In this way 
Facebook can enforce its Real Name Policy. 
2. People who don’t wish to use their real name on Facebook expect Facebook’s credential to be 
root, not depending on any other.  
There will be many other organisations like Facebook who are interested in issuing and using 
their own credentials if they can be based on other (reliable) attributes: probably Skype, but possibly 
also your favourite book store chain. Should the scheme manager allow this, and on which grounds? 
These decisions are political in nature, and they involve the identity fabric of our society and also 
considerable commercial interest. For this reason, we firmly believe that the scheme manager should 
be set-up and run as an independent non-profit and potentially distributed organisation. 
(Within the pilot phase Facebook is not involved, but a similar issue has come up; we decided in 
favour of a root credential, thus preventing dependencies and verifications of other attributes.) 
Omitted functionalities  In this project, we deployed an efficient implementation of the basics of 
Idemix. This attribute-based credential technology provides several advanced features that we did not 
include in this pilot for usability and/or for efficiency reasons. Nevertheless, future use cases and 
developments may require these functionalities. 
• Construction of logical AND / OR zero-knowledge proofs. Proofs about attributes, 
provided by the card for a verifier, can be combined into one proof by the conjunction 
(AND) and disjunction (OR) operations. 
• Combined proofs using users’ master keys. A master secret key must be generated and 
stored on a card which never leaves it. This key, used in each credential, can then be 
used to construct a single proof about attributes in different credentials on that card. 
Applying a similar method, this key can be used to bind verification of existing 
credentials and issuing of a new one on the card. 
Although this feature provides high security assurance, we chose to use for the time 
being independent proofs within a previously established single secure session. 
• Inequality and interval proofs about attributes. Using inequality and interval proofs, a 
user can demonstrate properties of attributes (see an example at the Age credential in 
Section 3). Furthermore, an identifier attribute can be demonstrated to be on a 
membership list without disclosing the identifier.  
In spite of these omitted functionalities all privacy and security properties (see in Section 2) of 
the Idemix system are incorporated. 
6  Conclusion 
In this paper we described the relevance and challenges of credential design in attribute-based 
identity management. Several use cases demonstrated the breadth of possible applications on a smart 
card that supports attribute-based credentials. The main reason for this diversity is that attributes, 
issued by the most authoritative organisations, can be disclosed independently. Therefore, verifiers 
learn all relevant information to authenticate and authorise users but nothing more, thus contributing to 
data minimisation. 
Recommendations  We conclude the paper with six principles for credential design in the context of 
attribute-based credentials.  
1. Attributes in one credential form a coherent set.  
2. Each attribute in one credential falls under the responsibiility of a single most authoritative 
issuer.  
3. Attribute duplication (same content, multiple issuers) is avoided.  
4. Verifiers can read only a limited, predefined set of attributes.  
5. Credential dependencies are public.  
6. An independent non-profit scheme manager should decide about such dependencies.  
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